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Basque Studies Program Newsletter · Issue 40, 1989



Distortion and Reality: 
Violence in the Basque Country


by Carmelo Urza

With all of the media coverage of politically motivated violence in the Basque Country, it is possible that the casual observer has lost proper perspective regarding the issue of safety there. The purpose of this article is to examine the level of violent crime in one Basque city and compare it to that of major Spanish and American cities. Hopefully, through this exercise, we will gain new insights concerning the scope of violence in the Basque provinces and in our own country.

Visitors to the Basque Country are often perplexed by the sharply contrasting images of the area presented to them. Basque government tourist publications portray bucolic farms and villages, magnificent beaches, and green mountains. Villagers are depicted as deeply rooted in tradition and city dwellers as sophisticated Europeans. To the foreign visitor, life there appears tranquil and normal. Indeed, Americans who have lived in the Basque Country for any period of time grow fond of the warmth and hospitality of its citizens.

And yet when the Basque Country is portrayed in newspapers, magazines, scholarly publications, or televised news, they reflect a constant stream of violent images. Usually, the media focus on the politically motivated violence of the Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) organization. In the face of such coverage, the casual observer reasonably draws the conclusion that a visit to the Basque Country represents an extraordinary risk to personal safety. In a further extrapolation the Basque Country may even be equated with Beirut and Ulster and the Basques thought of as "a bunch of terrorists."

How then does one reconcile these sharply contradictory images of a bucolic Arcadia and those of a war-torn zone? Which of these realities is illusory, and which true? In all likelihood, both are exaggerated. It is obvious that the Basque Country is not exempt from the problems of modern societies: drugs, alcoholism, domestic strife, and common crime. It is also undeniable that politically motivated violence occurs, though perhaps with less frequency and on a smaller scale than generally believed. Indeed, the very nature of media coverage emphasizes the negative and the sensational incidents associated with "terrorism." According to political scientist Leonard Weinberg, television networks distort terrorism. In an interview in the University of Nevada newspaper Sagebrush, he says: "Network shows have exaggerated the amount of terrorism in the Middle East in relation to Latin America. [In fact,] the volume of terrorism in the Middle East has been the same as in Latin America."

Furthermore, in recent years many Americans have changed travel plans in order to avoid the risk of falling victim to highly publicized international terrorism. However, John Allen Paulos points out in Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and Its Consequences that the seventeen Americans killed by terrorists in 1985 were among the 28 million who traveled abroad that year, reflecting a one chance in 1.6 million of becoming a victim. "Compare that," he writes, "with these annual rates in the United States: one chance in 68,000 of choking to death; one chance in 75,000 of dying in a bicycle crash; one chance in 20,000 of drowning; and one chance in 5,300 of dying in a car crash."

It is possible that the same factors of media distortion are in play relative to the Basque situation. While any analytical tool is imperfect, an emotionally pregnant subject like political violence is best examined through cold, statistical eyes. In order to provide the proper perspective, the violent crime figures of other cities in Spain and the United States have also been provided here.

The City of San Sebastián has been selected to represent the Basque Country for several reasons. First, recent crime statistics are not available for the Basque Country as a whole. If they were, one would have to decide whether to include Navarra and the Department of the Atlantic Pyrenees or only that area represented by the autonomous Basque government. Secondly, the mixture of urban and rural areas would make it difficult to compare with similar areas in the U.S. and Spain.

The selection of San Sebastián to represent the whole probably inflates the crime statistics since it is an area of high tourist or transient involvement and an area of ETA activity. Obviously, violence in San Sebastián is not limited to the political situation. Indeed, the Spanish government does not even distinguish between criminal and politically motivated violence, and consequently, neither do the statistics below:


TABLE I: Reported Crimes (1987)

City: Madrid Barcelona Sevilla San Sebastian
Population: 4,777,432 4,627,000 1,532,462 177,622
Murders: 2 8 3 1
Sex offenses (incl. rape) 664 312 106 21
Criminal injury 3,484 1,598 557 67
Robbery with assault, intimidation 19,189 10,153 2,641 279


Since the population of these cities varies considerably, Table II reflects the number of people affected by each incident. Thus, one person per 2,388 inhabitants was murdered in Madrid in 1987.

TABLE II: Ratio of Inhabitants per Incident (1987)

City: Madrid Barcelona Sevilla San Sebastian Average Ratio
Murders: 2,388,716 578,400 510,821 177,622 913,890
Sex offenses (incl. rape) 7,195 14,831 14,457 8,458 11,235
Criminal injury 1,371 2,896 2,751 2,651 2,417
Robbery with assault, intimidation 249 465 580 637 481


Comparing the ratio of inhabitants per incident in San Sebastián with that of the other three cities, we see that it has the lowest rate of robbery with assault, the highest in the category of murder and falls somewhere in the middle in the other two categories.


TABLE III: Offenses Known to Police (1986)

City: Boise, ID Reno, NV San Francisco Wash.,DC Chicago
Population: 108,390 110,430 749,000 629,100 3,009,530
Murder/
manslaughter
0 8 114 194 744
Forcible rape (1985) 56 79 492 328 1,792
Aggravated assault 306 410 3,815 4,181 33,529


Table IV reflects the ratio of inhabitants per incident as a means of taking into consideration a vastly different population base.


TABLE IV: Ratio of Inhabitants per Incident (1986)

City: Boise, ID Reno, NV San Francisco Wash., DC Chicago Avg. per capita
Murder 0 13,804 6,570 3,243 4,045 6,915*
Forcible rape 1,936 1,398 1,522 1,918 1,679 1,690
Agg. assault 354 269 196 150 90 211
      * excluding Boise

In all three crime categories, Boise had the lowest ratio of incidents per number of inhabitants. Washington, D.C. had the highest murder rate, Reno the highest incidence of rape, and Chicago the most aggravated assaults.

A comparison of the ratio between inhabitants affected per incident in the U.S. (Table IV) and in Spain (Table II), reveals some alarming figures. For example, the incidence of murder is 737 times greater in the American capital than in the capital of Spain. The incidence of rape is almost eleven times greater in Reno than in Barcelona. This figure is likely much higher, since this category for the cities of Spain includes all reported sexual offenses and is not limited to forcible rapes as in the case of the U.S. cities. It is difficult to correlate the Spanish categories of "criminal injury" and "robbery with assault" with the U.S. category of "aggravated assault." A global comparison of these categories does reveal, however, a much higher average incidence of assault in the U.S. cities. Indeed, with the exception of a lack of murders in Boise in 1986, the rate of crime in the U.S. cities is significantly higher than in any of the Spanish cities.

Finally, by isolating the crime figures of San Sebastián and comparing them with those of the American cities, we see that the murder rate is thirteen times greater in Reno than in San Sebastián, twenty-seven times greater in San Francisco, forty-four times greater in Chicago, and fifty-five times greater in Washington, D.C.

The gap in the sexual offenses versus rape category is smaller but still significant with a factor of 4.3 greater incidence in Boise, 6.0 in Reno, 5.5 in San Francisco, 4.4 in Washington, D.C., and 5.0 in Chicago. It is also evident that the aggravated assault/criminal injury/robbery with assault type of crime is significantly lower in San Sebastián than in any of the targeted American cities.

It may be argued that politically and criminally motivated violence is random to a large degree. And yet, while not without exceptions, politically motivated violence in the Basque Country tends to be selective. ETA primarily targets official representatives of the Spanish government, particularly the Spanish police and military. Consequently, the incidence of violent action against those groups would be higher than the norm. Inversely, it would be lower than the norm for those not belonging to those groups.

In conclusion, there is no question that politically and criminally motivated violence does take place in San Sebastián and in the statistics above, the degree and scope of that violence is not nearly as high as the media would have us believe. Indeed, it is evident that San Sebastián is significantly safer than most American cities. Clearly, the Basque Country's reputation for violence has been created as a direct result of the nature, rather than the extent, of its violence.

Notes

Table 1:

A) Statistics on crime provided by the U.S. Department of Justice, Central Headquarters of the Judicial Police, Technical Bureau, Criminal Statistics Section.

B) 1987 population statistics for Madrid, Barcelona, and Seville were provided by the Spanish embassy in Washington, D.C.

C) 1987 population statistics for San Sebastián were provided by the San Sebastián city hall.

Table III:

A) Timothy J. Flanagan and Katherine M. Jamieson, eds., Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1987. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1988.

B) Population figures provided by: U.S. Bureau of Census, Country and City Data Book, 1988. U.S. Government Printing Office.

John Allen Paulos, Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and Its Consequences (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), p. 7.


  


Copyright © 2000 the Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada, Reno. All rights reserved. Updated 26 February 2001. E-mail: basque@unr.edu